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INTRODUCTION
In 2012, the United States spent over three-quarters of a billion dollars
funding government agencies that produce and broadcast programming1
around the globe.2 Yet, for over sixty years, all international broadcasts
produced by the federal government could not be disseminated within the
United States. A longstanding provision contained within the Information
and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (commonly known as the Smith–
Mundt Act) prohibited the federal government from domestically
disseminating any government-produced programming intended for a
foreign audience, such as Voice of America and Radio Free Europe
broadcasts.3 That all changed when the ban was lifted on July 2, 2013,
allowing the U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of

1

In this Note, “programming” refers to all text, pictures, audio, and video intended for distribution
to an audience. The terms “programming,” “broadcasts,” “materials,” and “content” are used
interchangeably.
2
BROAD. BD. OF GOVERNORS, BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 47
(2012), available at http://www.bbg.gov/wp-content/media/2013/05/BBG-2012-Annual-Report.pdf
[http://perma.cc/C45D-PCMF].
3
As explained in Part I of this Note infra, a de facto ban existed in the original Smith–Mundt Act
that was passed in 1948. See 22 U.S.C. § 1461 (Supp. II 1948). A de jure ban was in place from 1972 to
2013. See id. (Supp. II 1972); id. §§ 1461, 1461-1a (2012). From 1990 on, Americans could access
government-produced materials that were over twelve years old. Id. (1994). Additionally, certain
Americans could “examin[e]” government-produced programming in person at the State Department’s
headquarters starting in 1948. Id. (Supp. II 1948).
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Governors (BBG) to disseminate their programming to the American
people with few restrictions.4
The repeal of the domestic dissemination ban has generated an
impassioned debate. Supporters laud the repeal because they believe it will
promote government transparency, allowing Americans to monitor
overseas government broadcasts5 and to study source material that was
previously off limits.6 Others favor the repeal because they believe it will
allow the State Department and the BBG to target émigrés with proAmerican programming in their native language, countering the foreign
propaganda that freely streams into the United States.7 Those opposed
believe that the repeal will compromise the independence of the press8 and
allow the federal government to direct propaganda at its own people.9 More
radical members of this group believe that the repeal is an ominous first

4

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 1078, 126 Stat.
1632, 1957–59 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1461-1a (2012)). For the original text of the
bill that was incorporated into the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, see H.R.
5736, 112th Cong. (2012) (“Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 2012”). A predecessor to this bill was
introduced on July 13, 2010. H.R. 5729, 111th Cong. (2010) (“The Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of
2010”).
5
See, e.g., Emily T. Metzgar, Public Diplomacy, Smith-Mundt and the American Public, 17 COMM.
L. & POL’Y 67, 99 (2012) (“Reform would make government evaluation of American public diplomacy
efforts easier to measure and the increased visibility and transparency would lead to improved
accountability to the taxpayers who fund the work.”); Allen W. Palmer & Edward L. Carter, The SmithMundt Act’s Ban on Domestic Propaganda: An Analysis of the Cold War Statute Limiting Access to
Public Diplomacy, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2006) (“The domestic dissemination ban may have
outlived its usefulness and relevance. . . . [and] contradicts general U.S. policy promoting transparency
and encouraging the free and open flow of information.”).
6
See, e.g., Palmer & Carter, supra note 5, at 11; Charles F. Gormly, Note, The United States
Information Agency Domestic Dissemination Ban: Arguments for Repeal, 9 ADMIN. L. REV. AM. U.
191, 198 (1995). Others believe the ban was simply ineffective. See, e.g., Jeremy Berkowitz, Raising
the Iron Curtain on Twitter: Why the United States Must Revise the Smith-Mundt Act to Improve Public
Diplomacy, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 269, 286–87 (2009); Palmer & Carter, supra note 5, at 29;
Gormly, supra, at 202–04.
7
See, e.g., NDAA 2013: Congress Approves Domestic Deceptive Propaganda, RT (May 22, 2012,
5:03 PM), http://rt.com/usa/propaganda-us-smith-amendment-903/ [http://perma.cc/MV59-U4AW];
Thornberry and Smith Introduce Bill to Help Counter Threats in Information Age, U.S. CONGRESSMAN
MAC THORNBERRY (May 15, 2012), http://thornberry.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?
DocumentID=296108 [http://perma.cc/FNW7-QR8S]; infra note 160 and accompanying text.
8
See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, Rep. Smith on His Controversial Bills, SALON (May 22, 2012, 11:05
PM), http://www.salon.com/2012/05/22/rep_smith_on_his_controversial_bills [http://perma.cc/PHH2R9CH]; see also Palmer & Carter, supra note 5, at 11 (“In 1995, reports circulated within USIA that
U.S. commercial TV and radio operators were lobbying to retain the [Smith–Mundt] Act restrictions on
domestic information in order to limit news competition between government and private news
agencies.”).
9
Historically, Americans have had an “intense dislike of all sorts of government propaganda
operations.” Burton Paulu, The Smith-Mundt Act: A Legislative History, 30 JOURNALISM Q. 300, 301
(1953).
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step toward a bleak Orwellian future in which the federal government
dominates American media.10
Fueling the debate is widespread misunderstanding about the repeal.
The bill’s own sponsors, Representatives Mac Thornberry (R-Tex.) and
Adam Smith (D-Wash.),11 have expressed differing views about the
underlying purpose of their amending legislation.12 Adding to the confusion
are inaccurate stories published shortly after the ban was officially
repealed,13 as well as preexisting uncertainty about the federal
government’s ability to disseminate government-produced programming
within the United States.14
As argued in this Note, the repeal of the domestic dissemination ban is
both beneficial and detrimental. On the one hand, the repeal grants
American citizens greater access to information about the federal
government and bestows the federal government with greater flexibility to
counter anti-American sentiment within the United States. However, the
repeal changed too much too quickly. Despite broad support in the legal
academy for a limited repeal,15 Congress stripped the Smith–Mundt Act of
10

See, e.g., Mark LeVine, The High Price of ‘Dark Fusion,’ AL JAZEERA (June 4, 2012, 12:14
PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/06/20126294459762126.html [http://perma.cc/
8VY8-B4HW] (arguing that the repeal of the domestic dissemination ban is part of an “even darker
Orwellianism” developing within the United States); Joe Wolverton, II, Congressmen Propose
Domestic Distribution of Pro-U.S. Propaganda, NEW AM. (May 30, 2012), http://www.
thenewamerican.com/usnews/congress/item/11560-congressmen-propose-domestic-distribution-of-prous-propaganda [http://perma.cc/4ETB-E5CB] (“[C]itizens and residents will be exposed to governmentproduced propaganda in a manner that would impress even Orwell’s Big Brother.”).
11
H.R. 5736, 112th Cong. (2012). The Smith–Mundt Modernization Act of 2012 was incorporated
into the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 1078, 126
Stat. 1632, 1957–59 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1461-1a (2012)).
12
Compare Thornberry, supra note 7 (stating that the amendment to the Smith–Mundt Act would
primarily assist in combating domestic terrorism), with Greenwald, supra note 8 (stating that the
amendment to the Smith–Mundt Act would primarily promote government transparency).
13
See, e.g., Michael Hastings, Congressmen Seek to Lift Propaganda Ban, BUZZFEED (May 18,
2012, 3:27 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/mhastings/congressmen-seek-to-lift-propaganda-ban
[http://perma.cc/5YN-6Y2C] (misstating that the repeal of the ban applied to all government agencies
instead of just the State Department and the BBG); see also Juan Cole, Congress Wants the Department
of Defense to Propagandize Americans, INFORMED COMMENT (May 20, 2012), http://www.juancole.
com/2012/05/congress-wants-the-department-of-defense-to-propagandize-americans.html [http://perma.
cc/Y3QP-YJAT] (mischaracterizing the Smith–Mundt Modernization Act of 2012 as legislation that
applied to the Department of Defense).
14
See Robert Bejesky, Public Diplomacy or Propaganda? Targeted Messages and Tardy
Corrections to Unverified Reporting, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 967, 990–97 (2012); Metzgar, supra note 5, at
67–68.
15
Several academics advocated for repealing the domestic dissemination ban, but only if it were
coupled with new limitations. See, e.g., Berkowitz, supra note 6, at 307–08 (arguing for a complete
overhaul of the government broadcasting bureaucracy and advocating for attribution of governmentproduced programming because unattributed pieces “increase the amount of distrust between the
government and its people”); Metzgar, supra note 5, at 96–97 (“Many concerns about potentially
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all meaningful restrictions on the domestic dissemination of governmentproduced programming,16 imparting the State Department and the BBG
with enormous power to anonymously disseminate their programming
within the United States.
Rather than argue for or against the repeal of the domestic
dissemination ban, this Note contends that government-produced
programming disseminated within the United States should be clearly
attributed. Unlike a blanket prohibition on the domestic dissemination of
government-produced programming, which has proven difficult to
enforce,17 attribution is straightforward and comparatively easy to
implement. Moreover, attribution preserves the benefits of the repeal—
bolstering national security and fostering government transparency—
without allowing the federal government to covertly disseminate influential
programming within the United States.
This Note is divided into three Parts. Part I provides an overview of
the legislative history of the Smith–Mundt Act from its passage in 1948 up
through the repeal of the domestic dissemination ban in 2013. Part II
analyzes the text of the 2013 legislation and other applicable laws and
regulations. Finally, Part III argues for a legislatively imposed or a
judicially imposed attribution requirement for all State Department- and
BBG-produced programming disseminated within the United States.
I.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SMITH–MUNDT ACT

A. World War II–1953: Origins of the Smith–Mundt Act
The Smith–Mundt Act traces its origins to World War II. In an effort
to consolidate wartime propaganda efforts, President Franklin Roosevelt
formed the Office of War Information (OWI) in 1942 by executive order.18
The mission of the OWI was to counter Axis propaganda19 and to provide
“information programs designed to facilitate the intelligent
understanding . . . of the war policies, activities, and aims of the

loosing Pentagon ‘psy-ops’ on the domestic American public with reform of [the Smith–Mundt Act]
can be avoided by carefully defining the conditions under which the ban would no longer apply.”);
Palmer & Carter, supra note 5, at 34 (arguing for a repeal of the ban on the conditions that governmentproduced programming be subject to an attribution requirement and that limitations be imposed on the
amount of government-produced programming disseminated domestically).
16
See infra Part II.
17
Berkowitz, supra note 6, at 286–87; Palmer & Carter, supra note 5, at 29; Gormly, supra note 6,
at 202–04.
18
Consolidating Certain War Information Functions into an Office of War Information, Exec.
Order No. 9182, 7 Fed. Reg. 4468, 4468–69 (June 13, 1942).
19
Id. at 4469.
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Government.”20 The recently formed Voice of America (VOA), a
government-funded news service, was incorporated into the OWI, and
further expanded its broadcasts of pro-American news stories around the
world.21 The OWI also conducted psychological warfare overseas, using
radio and print publications to demoralize the enemy,22 and oversaw the
Bureau of Motion Pictures, which collaborated with Hollywood to develop
propaganda films.23 The pro-American Hollywood films were particularly
important for bolstering support within the United States. OWI Director
Elmer Davis once remarked, “The easiest way to inject a propaganda idea
into most people’s minds is to let it go in through the medium of an
entertainment picture when they do not realize that they are being
propagandized.”24 However, as the outcome of the War became
increasingly certain, the need for domestic propaganda waned. In 1945, as
major combat operations came to an end, the OWI was terminated and its
remaining broadcasting operations were transferred to the State
Department.25
Not long after the War, the federal government considered establishing
a permanent government broadcasting agency. In October 1945,
Representative Sol Bloom (D-N.Y.) introduced a bill that would have
allowed the Secretary of State to more aggressively broadcast governmentproduced programming internationally.26 But due to administrative delays
20

See ALLAN M. WINKLER, THE POLITICS OF PROPAGANDA: THE OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
1942–1945, at 34 (1978). See generally History, BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS,
http://www.bbg.gov/about-the-agency/history/ [http://perma.cc/39PV-BUYR] (providing a timeline of
the development of government broadcasting).
21
VOA History, INSIDE VOA (Nov. 26, 2014, 5:01 PM), http://www.insidevoa.com/section/
voa_history/2330.html [http://perma.cc/PE4R-GEGU] (providing a timeline of the development of
VOA). By the end of the war, VOA was broadcasting in forty languages. WILSON P. DIZARD JR.,
INVENTING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: THE STORY OF THE U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY 25 (2004). VOA is
currently the largest broadcasting service in the United States. See Voice of America, BROADCASTING
BOARD OF GOVERNORS, http://www.bbg.gov/broadcasters/voa/ [http://perma.cc/CB7H-WWH3]. It is
now under the supervision of the BBG. Id.
22
WINKLER, supra note 20, at 113, 115, 117–19, 142. One of the most fascinating pieces of World
War II-era propaganda is a novel written by Nobel Prize-winning author John Steinbeck about a small
town invaded by a foreign army. JOHN STEINBECK, THE MOON IS DOWN (1942).
23
CLAYTON R. KOPPES & GREGORY D. BLACK, HOLLYWOOD GOES TO WAR: HOW POLITICS,
PROFITS, AND PROPAGANDA SHAPED WORLD WAR II MOVIES 59 (1987).
24
Id. at 64.
25
HARRY S. TRUMAN, Statement by the President Upon Signing Order Concerning Government
Information Programs (Aug. 31 1945), in OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REG., PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: HARRY S. TRUMAN, 1945, at 252–53 (1961). After the war, VOA
was reduced significantly: two-thirds of its broadcasting staff were let go, and the number of languages
broadcast was cut in half. VOA in the Postwar Years, INSIDE VOA (Feb. 13, 2007, 7:00 PM),
http://www.insidevoa.com/content/a-13-34-2007-post-wwii-history-111602679/177529.html
[http://
perma.cc/N5TW-TVKK].
26
See Paulu, supra note 9, at 301.

516

109:511 (2015)

Apple Pie Propaganda?

and legislative bickering, the “Bloom Bill” died one year after it was
introduced.27 However, the idea of a peacetime government broadcasting
agency lived on.28 In the months that followed the demise of the Bloom
Bill, Democrats and Republicans continued to spar over whether to
establish a permanent government broadcasting agency that would be
operational during wartime and peacetime alike.29
Striking the right balance between government broadcasting and
private broadcasting proved difficult. A number of Republican
congressmen opposed a government-funded broadcasting agency over
concerns that government-produced programming would supplant, rather
than supplement, privately produced programming.30 As a compromise, a
few representatives suggested that a future bill require the State
Department to rely primarily on privately produced programming for its
broadcasts.31 Some even favored turning “the whole [State Department
broadcasting] operation over to NBC and CBS,”32 but this was never done.
Ultimately, the suggestion of requiring the State Department to employ
private broadcasters assuaged Republican concerns about government
interference in the private sector, and also addressed budgetary concerns;
privately produced programming was believed to be less costly and higher
quality than State Department-produced programming.33
Several months after the failed Bloom Bill, Congress began drafting
legislation to establish a permanent government broadcasting agency that
would not encroach on the efforts of private broadcasters. In May 1947,
Representative Karl E. Mundt (R-S.D.) introduced such a bill, which was
entitled the “Information and Educational Exchange Act.”34 The Mundt
Bill, as it was more commonly known, drew many of its provisions from
the failed Bloom Bill.35 According to Representative Mundt, the bill was an
anti-Soviet measure designed to “give legislative authority for our Voice of
America short-wave program and also set up a broad over-all program to
tell the truth about America in the areas of the world where we are today

27

Id. at 302.
Despite the legislative tumult, VOA broadcasts persisted, buoyed by temporary funding provided
by the Judiciary Appropriation Bill for 1947. Id.
29
Id. at 302–03. Concern about government–industry relationships in the broadcasting sector
persists to this day. See Palmer & Carter, supra note 5, at 11.
30
Paulu, supra note 9, at 303.
31
Id. at 308.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
H.R. 3342, 80th Cong. (1947).
35
Id.; Paulu, supra note 9, at 308–09.
28
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being misinterpreted abroad by the voices coming from the Moscow
headquarters of Red fascism.”36
Although the Mundt Bill was introduced as a means to counteract
communist propaganda, some representatives opposed the bill on the
grounds that handing over international government broadcasting to the
“leftists” in the State Department would actually increase the amount of
communist propaganda worldwide.37 Other representatives opposed the
Mundt Bill simply because they believed the State Department would
administer international broadcasting ineptly.38
Debate over the Mundt Bill was heated.39 At one point during the
deliberations, Representative Mundt bemoaned, “Never since I have been
in Congress have I heard such a disorganized collection of misinformation
circulated about any one piece of legislation as about this legislation.”40
Yet, despite vocal opposition throughout the drafting process, the bill easily
passed the House41 and Senate.42 In early 1948, President Harry Truman
signed into law the Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948—
or, as it was more commonly known, the Smith–Mundt Act.43
Initially, the State Department was given full responsibility for
administering the provisions of the Smith–Mundt Act.44 The State
Department continued to broadcast VOA programming and began
disseminating companion news bulletins and motion pictures.45 In 1953,
President Dwight Eisenhower established a new government agency, the
United States Information Agency (USIA), to coordinate the federal
government’s international broadcasting and educational exchange

36

93 CONG. REC. 4638 (1947).
See Paulu, supra note 9, at 310–11.
38
Id. at 310.
39
Id. at 311. Debate over the bill spanned six days. Id.
40
93 CONG. REC. 6754.
41
Id. at 7617. The bill passed the House by a vote of 273–97. Paulu, supra note 9, at 312. Of those
who voted for the bill, 121 were Republicans, 151 were Democrats, and 1 was an American Laborite.
Id.
42
The bill passed the Senate by a unanimous vote. Paulu, supra note 9, at 314. Before passage in
the Senate, the bill was amended slightly by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Id. at 313. The
most notable change was the separation of broadcasting services from educational exchange services.
Id.
43
22 U.S.C. § 1431 (Supp. II 1948); Pub. L. No. 80-402, § 2, 62 Stat. 6 (1948). The Smith–Mundt
Act was named after its cosponsors Representative Mundt and Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-N.J.).
Paulu, supra note 9, at 300 n.1.
44
22 U.S.C. § 1461.
45
Paulu, supra note 9, at 300. Although the State Department was permitted to create and
broadcast its own materials, it was required “to utilize, to the maximum extent practicable, the services
and facilities of private agencies, including existing American press, publishing, radio, motion picture,
and other agencies, through contractual arrangements or otherwise.” § 1437.
37
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services.46 The USIA was created specifically to “lead to substantial
economies and significantly improved effectiveness of administration” for
countering anti-American propaganda abroad.47
1. The De Facto Dissemination Ban.—There is no doubt that the
Smith–Mundt Act permitted the federal government to disseminate its
message abroad, but it is less certain whether it prohibited the federal
government from disseminating its message within the United States. Some
have argued that the original version of the Smith–Mundt Act permitted
domestic dissemination because it did not contain an explicit prohibition on
the domestic dissemination of government-produced programming, and
because it allowed certain members of the American public to access these
otherwise off-limits materials at specified government agencies.48 However,
a more plausible reading is that a de facto ban existed. Although there was
no explicit ban on the domestic dissemination of government-produced
programming in the original Smith–Mundt Act, there were clear
restrictions on who could view them; government-produced programming
could only be “examin[ed]” by “representatives of United States press
associations” and could only be “made available” to members of
Congress.49 Such strict constraints on accessing these materials strongly
suggest that Congress did not want this information to be widely distributed
to the American public.
Moreover, many Congressional members did not trust the State
Department because they believed it contained numerous communist
sympathizers.50 In fact, Congress was so concerned about this that the
screening process for those implementing the Smith–Mundt Act’s
international broadcasting program was “more stringent than the one given
to people working on the atomic bomb during the war.”51 Consequently,
given this acute concern over those responsible for international
broadcasting, it is doubtful that Congress would have risked allowing the

46

Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1953, 18 Fed. Reg. 4542, 4543 (Aug. 4, 1953) (transferring all
broadcasting operations and educational exchange services from the State Department to the USIA).
47
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Special Message to the Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan 8
of 1953 Relating to the Establishment of the U.S. Information Agency (June 1, 1953), in OFFICE OF THE
FEDERAL REG., PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
1953, at 350 (1960).
48
See, e.g., Palmer & Carter, supra note 5, at 9.
49
§ 1461.
50
See id. § 1434 (“No citizen or resident of the United States, whether or not now in the employ of
the Government, may be employed or assigned to duties by the Government under this chapter until
such individual has been investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and a report thereon has
been made to the Secretary of State . . . .”).
51
Paulu, supra note 9, at 311.
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State Department to freely disseminate its programming within the United
States.
Further, the domestic dissemination of government-produced
programming would have been politically toxic. Congress did not want to
draw parallels with the government of the Soviet Union, which was widely
believed to be inundating its people with propaganda at the time.52
Additionally, Americans were tired of watching the government-produced
programming that was widely broadcast within the United States during
World War II53—subjecting them to more such programming so soon after
the War likely would have resulted in public outcry.54
Thus, even though no explicit ban on the domestic dissemination of
government-produced programming existed in the original version of the
Smith–Mundt Act, it was forbidden in practice.55
B. 1954–1971: Applying the Smith–Mundt Act
For a dozen years, the de facto domestic dissemination ban remained
untouched and untested. Then, in 1965, Congress passed a joint resolution
(1965 Resolution) permitting the domestic release of a USIA film on the
life of President John F. Kennedy, entitled Years of Lightning, Day of
Drums.56 The 1965 Resolution permitted the USIA to transfer copies of the
film to the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, and gave the
Center exclusive rights to distribute the program for viewing within the

52

See ROBERT CONQUEST, REFLECTIONS ON A RAVAGED CENTURY 101–11 (2000).
See Palmer & Carter, supra note 5, at 6 (“By the end of World War II, many Americans held a
negative perception of government propaganda not only because of censorship and misinformation by
the American government but also because of the extensive anti-Jew and pro-Nazi propaganda
disseminated in Germany throughout the 1930s.”); Paulu, supra note 9, at 300 (“In peacetime . . .
[Americans] had always opposed government information services . . . . The passage of the [Smith–
Mundt Act], therefore, marked a significant departure from traditional American policy.”).
54
“Americans insisted that government efforts at persuasion at home . . . should remain benign,
affirming their popular belief that government should not be the guardian of the public conscience, and
that the electorate was capable of making rational choices free of undue influence from government
itself . . . .” Palmer & Carter, supra note 5, at 6.
55
A de facto ban on the domestic dissemination of government-produced programming was
confirmed “by Congress’[s] perceived need to pass legislation in order to permit the domestic release of
certain [government-produced] films.” Brett Holladay, Making the Argument that the Smith-Mundt Act
Has Little Control over the Press’ Publication of U.S. Government-Produced Foreign News, 10 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 608, 614 (2012).
56
Joint Resolution: To Allow the Showing in the United States of the United States Information
Agency Film “John F. Kennedy—Years of Lightning, Day of Drums,” Pub. L. No. 89-274, 79 Stat.
1009 (1965). The film can now be viewed in its entirety online. Bruce Herschensohn, John F. Kennedy:
Years of Lightning/Day of Drums, YOUTUBE (June 5, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=PvN5ecqCFk0 [http://perma.cc/D3UM-EVQY].
53
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United States.57 However, concerns over creating precedent for future
domestic dissemination of USIA material led Congress to clarify that the
1965 Resolution was “limited solely to the film” and was not to be
construed so as “to establish a precedent for making other materials
prepared by the [USIA] available for general distribution in the United
States.”58 Although Congress was willing to give a one-time pass for a
particularly relevant piece of government-produced programming, it was
not willing to condone all dissemination of such programming, stating:
Any documentary film which has been, is now being, or is hereafter produced
by any Government department or agency . . . concerning the life, character,
and public service of any [Government official] . . . shall not be distributed or
shown in public in this country during the lifetime of the said official or after
the death of such official unless authorized by law in each specific case.59

Congress’s compulsion to pass a resolution permitting the domestic
dissemination of a single USIA film demonstrates that the Smith–Mundt
Act effectively prohibited the domestic dissemination of governmentproduced programming.60 If there were any doubts about whether the
Smith–Mundt Act contained a de facto ban on the domestic dissemination
of government-produced programming, the 1965 Resolution put those
doubts to rest.61
The reach of the de facto domestic dissemination ban on governmentproduced programming, however, remained unresolved. In 1967, the U.S.
Advisory Commission on Information issued a report that advocated for
easing the restrictions on the availability of USIA materials within the
United States.62 Noting that there was “nothing in the [Smith–Mundt Act]
specifically forbidding making USIA materials available to American
audiences,”63 the Commission suggested that it was time for the “walls [to]
come down” and allow the American public to readily access this
information.64 Not unlike modern-day proponents for repealing the
domestic dissemination ban, the Commission believed that allowing
Americans to access government-produced programming would promote

57

§ 2, 79 Stat. at 1009. This transfer of the film and its rights was not complimentary, however—
Congress charged the Center $122,000 to “reimburse the United States Government for its expenditures
in connection with production of the film.” Id. § 3, 79 Stat. at 1009.
58
Id. § 1, 79 Stat. at 1009.
59
Id. § 4, 79 Stat. at 1009 (emphasis added).
60
See Gormly, supra note 6, at 196.
61
See id.
62
FRANK STANTON ET AL., U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INFO., THE TWENTY-SECOND REPORT OF
THE UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INFORMATION 22 (1967).
63
Id. at 22–23.
64
Id.

521

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

government transparency and academic study.65 However, the Commission
stopped short of advocating for the active dissemination of these materials
within the United States; instead, it recommended only that Congress
“‘mak[e] available’ USIA materials, not [promote] their domestic
distribution.”66 Despite this reservation, the Commission’s underlying
stance was clear—the domestic dissemination ban should be relaxed. Yet,
there was no push from Congress to reform the domestic dissemination
ban. In fact, the opposite occurred: in the years that followed the
Commission’s report, Congress further emphasized that governmentproduced materials were not to be disseminated within the United States.
C. 1972–2009: Cementing the Ban
The first true test to the de facto domestic dissemination ban came in
1972 when Senator James L. Buckley (D-N.Y.) requested a USIAproduced film entitled Czechoslovakia 1968 to be rebroadcast on New
York television.67 Senator J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) opposed Senator
Buckley’s request, believing that the USIA could only disseminate its
programming abroad.68 Acting Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst,
arguing on Senator Buckley’s behalf, advocated that the proposed
rebroadcast did not violate the text of the Smith–Mundt Act.69 Although not
“altogether free from doubt,” Mr. Kleindienst believed that the Smith–
Mundt Act did not intend to prohibit all dissemination of USIA-produced
programming within the United States;70 after all, he argued, the agency
could “make . . . available upon request” such programming to members of
Congress.71 Senator Fulbright and other members of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations vehemently disagreed with Mr. Kleindienst’s
interpretation of the Smith–Mundt Act, calling it a “distortion of []
legislative intent.”72 Specifically, the Committee was concerned that by
allowing Senator Buckley to air the film, it would “pave the way for the
wholesale distribution of USIA materials” within the United States.73 In an
attempt to close this loophole in the Smith–Mundt Act, Senator Fulbright
proposed legislation to establish a “blanket prohibition” on the domestic

65

Id.
Id. at 23.
67
Holladay, supra note 55, at 614; Palmer & Carter, supra note 5, at 9.
68
S. REP. NO. 92-754, at 83 (1972).
69
Id. at 83–84.
70
Id. at 84.
71
Id. However, Mr. Kleindienst himself recognized that domestic dissemination had its limits,
stating that the USIA could not “actively engage in the domestic dissemination of its materials.” Id.
72
Id. at 85.
73
Id.
66
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distribution of USIA-produced programming.74 Soon thereafter, this blanket
prohibition was passed as part of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act
of 1972 (1972 Amendment).75
The 1972 Amendment made the Smith–Mundt Act’s de facto domestic
dissemination ban a de jure ban by explicitly forbidding the distribution of
USIA programming within the United States.76 However, the 1972
Amendment did more that make official the long-standing de facto
dissemination ban; it also expanded the public’s access to governmentproduced programming by adding “research students and scholars” to the
list of those who could legally examine these materials at specified
government agencies.77 In effect, the 1972 Amendment addressed both the
goals of Senator Fulbright, i.e., providing safeguards against the
widespread
dissemination
of
influential
government-produced
programming within the United States, and those of the U.S. Advisory
Commission on Information, i.e., increasing public access to these
otherwise inaccessible materials.
Thirteen years later,78 the 1972 Amendment’s explicit prohibition on
the domestic dissemination of government-produced materials was further
strengthened. In 1985, Senator Edward Zorinsky (D-Neb.) drafted an
amendment to the Smith–Mundt Act (1985 Amendment) that proposed
reinforcing the domestic dissemination ban.79 Senator Zorinsky was chiefly
concerned with the USIA’s “second mandate,” which permitted the Agency
to initiate cultural training programs for U.S. citizens.80 He believed that
this mandate could be used to “propagandize” the American people to
74

Id.
Pub. L. No. 92-352, § 204, 86 Stat. 489, 494 (1972).
76
Id. (“Any [government-produced material] shall not be disseminated within the United States, its
territories, or possessions, but, on request, shall be available in the English language at the Department
of State, at all reasonable times following its release as information abroad, for examination only by
representatives of United States press . . . , and by research students and scholars, and, on request, shall
be made available for examination only to Members of Congress.”). By 1989, the USIA was allowing
any person to examine these materials regardless of whether she was a journalist, research student, or
scholar. Gartner v. U.S. Info. Agency, 726 F. Supp. 1183, 1194 n.19 (S.D. Iowa 1989).
77
22 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976).
78
The years between the 1972 Amendment and the 1985 Amendment were marked by a
restructuring of government broadcasting agencies. In 1973, the Board for International Broadcasting
(BIB) was formed to broadcast government-produced programming specifically in countries without a
free press. See Board for International Broadcasting Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-129, §§ 2, 4, 87 Stat.
456, 457–59. In 1977, under the Carter Administration, the USIA was recast as the International
Communication Agency (ICA) in an attempt to rebrand the organization as one that showed “a decent
respect for the opinions of mankind.” 22 U.S.C. § 1461 (1996); Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977, 91
Stat. 1636. The ICA was short-lived, however, and in 1982 the agency was redesignated the USIA.
Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1982 and 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-241, § 303, 96 Stat.
273, 291 (1982).
79
131 CONG. REC. 14,945 (1985).
80
Id.
75
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adopt pro-communist views on foreign policy issues.81 In furtherance of his
proposal to reinforce the domestic dissemination ban, Senator Zorinsky
memorably stated: “The American taxpayer certainly does not need or want
his tax dollars used to support U.S. Government propaganda directed at
him or her.”82 In its final form, the 1985 Amendment required that “no
funds authorized to be appropriated to the [USIA] shall be used to
influence public opinion in the United States, and no program material
prepared by the [USIA] shall be distributed within the United States.”83 Just
as Senator Zorinsky intended, the 1985 Amendment did little to change
existing policy regarding the domestic dissemination ban. Rather, it served
to foreclose any possibility of the USIA disseminating its programming
within the United States.
The passage of the 1985 Amendment marked the zenith of the
domestic dissemination ban on government-produced programming. After
that date, cracks began to develop in the wall that Senators Fulbright and
Zorinsky built. In 1990, Congress passed an amendment to the Smith–
Mundt Act (1990 Amendment) that required the USIA director to “make
[programming] available to the Archivist of the United States, for domestic
distribution . . . 12 years after the preparation of the material.”84 Although
the 1990 Amendment was of little value for Americans seeking current
information on the government’s international broadcasting efforts,85 it
afforded citizens greater access to these materials for research and study
without raising concerns about the USIA creating programming
specifically for the purpose of “propagandizing” the American public.
The USIA was the primary agency for producing and broadcasting
programming overseas from its creation through the mid-1990s.86 In 1994,
all government broadcasting efforts targeting countries without a free press
were transferred to the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), a new
government agency under State Department control.87 In 1998, the USIA
81

Id. Similar language appears in the original Smith–Mundt Act. 22 U.S.C. § 1431 (Supp. II 1948)
(“The Congress declares that the objectives of this chapter are to enable the Government of the United
States to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual
understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries.” (emphasis
added)).
82
131 CONG. REC. 14,945.
83
22 U.S.C. § 1461-1a (1988).
84
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-246, § 202,
104 Stat. 15, 49 (1990). Materials over twelve years old were thought to be devoid of any ability to
propagandize.
85
Gormly, supra note 6, at 198.
86
However, there was a brief period during the Carter Administration when the USIA was
reorganized and rebranded as the ICA. See supra note 78.
87
United States International Broadcasting Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-236, §§ 304, 310, 108
Stat. 382, 434, 442.
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was abolished and its responsibilities reassigned to the BBG.88 Later that
year, the BBG became a government-funded, independent agency in charge
of overseeing all government-sponsored, nonmilitary international
broadcasting.89 Although the source of government broadcasting shifted
from an integrated, government-controlled agency to an independent,
government-funded agency, the goals and operations of the Smith–Mundt
Act—disseminating pro-American programming overseas—remained the
same.
The most significant development in this period had little to do with
the federal government. Advances in sophisticated information technology,
such as the Internet, cellular phones, and satellite television, was rapidly
changing how news was distributed and consumed. Just as private
broadcasters would be compelled to adapt to these technological
developments, so too would the federal government. In the mid-1990s, the
legal academy predicted that the free flow of information between
countries would soon render the Smith–Mundt Act’s domestic
dissemination ban unenforceable.90 However, the demise of the domestic
dissemination ban would not occur until almost twenty years later.
D. 2010–2013: Repealing the Ban
1. The 2010 Bill.—The first attempt at repealing the domestic
dissemination ban came in July 2010. Representatives Mac Thornberry (RTex.) and Adam Smith (D-Wash.) introduced “The Smith–Mundt
Modernization Act of 2010” (2010 Bill) into Congress.91 At its core, the
2010 Bill was a national security measure designed to “modernize
authorities to fight and win the war of ideas against violent extremist
ideologies over the [I]nternet and other mediums of information” within the
United States.92 However, contradictory language within the 2010 Bill
would have made its stated goal difficult to achieve. On the one hand, the
2010 Bill would have abolished the domestic dissemination ban, allowing
the State Department and the BBG to freely disseminate governmentproduced programming within the United States.93 On the other, it would
88

Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681–776 (1998); Berkowitz, supra note 6, at 279.
112 Stat. at 2681-776.
90
See e.g., Gormly, supra note 6, at 202–04. Gormly also believed the ban violated information
policy, contradicted the Freedom of Information Act, and frustrated the USIA’s ability to perform its
mission. Id. at 192–93.
91
H.R. 5729, 111th Cong. (2010). Eight other representatives cosponsored the bill. Id.
92
Id. However, this purpose seems inherently unachievable given the bill’s prohibition on
“influencing” or “propagandizing” the American people: any attempt by the State Department to “win
the war of ideas” within the United States inherently would be an exercise in influencing public
opinion.
93
Id.
89
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have strengthened the 1985 Amendment’s prohibition on “influencing
public opinion” in the United States94 by preventing the federal government
from “propagandizing” the American people.95 Like the Smith–Mundt
Act’s previous amending legislation, the 2010 Bill attempted to harmonize
allowing Americans greater access to government-produced programming
with barring the federal government from unduly influencing free public
discourse. However, rather than forge a workable compromise similar to
the 1972 Amendment,96 the 2010 Bill attempted to adopt two incompatible
positions—permission and prohibition—which made the legislation
impracticable. Unsurprisingly, the 2010 Bill died in Congress.97
Despite its shortcomings, the 2010 Bill is notable because it signaled a
turning point in how Congress perceived the Smith–Mundt Act’s domestic
dissemination ban. In decades prior, Congress was inclined to reinforce the
domestic dissemination ban, as it did in 1965, 1972, and 1985,98 but by
2010, Congress was willing to consider a complete repeal.99 This radical
change in perception is attributable to two major developments. First,
advances in information technology allowed people to communicate freely,
severely diminishing the government’s power to control the media.
Consequently, many began to doubt the effectiveness of state-made
propaganda generally,100 the domestic dissemination ban’s enforceability,101
and the overall feasibility of the statutory regime surrounding government
broadcasting.102 But the most salient reason for amending the Smith–Mundt
Act was to curb the threat of domestic terrorism. During the Cold War,
Congress was eager to distinguish the United States from the Soviet Union.
One way to do this, as demonstrated by Senator Zorinsky’s 1985
94

Id.
Id.
96
The 1972 Amendment mirrors the dual aims of the 2010 Bill, i.e., promoting government
transparency and establishing safeguards against the dissemination of government propaganda. See
supra Part I.C.
97
The 2010 Bill died after being referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. H.R. 5729 (111th):
Smith–Mundt Modernization Act of 2010, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/
111/hr5729 [http://perma.cc/Y38Z-NC53].
98
Essential Info., Inc. v. U.S. Info. Agency, 134 F.3d 1165, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that up
through 1998 “Congress[] repeated[ly] amend[ed] the [Smith–Mundt] Act to clarify and strengthen the
ban on domestic distribution of USIA materials”).
99
See H.R. 5729. Additionally, a more conservative bill proposed by Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.)
would have decreased the permissible release period from twelve years to two years. Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011, S. 2971, 111th Cong. § 127 (2010).
100
See Adam Weinstein, Is Congress Really Authorizing US Propaganda at Home?, MOTHER
JONES (May 22, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/05/congress-propaganda
[http://perma.cc/BS89-XVFB].
101
Gormly, supra note 6, at 220.
102
See S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL
YEARS 2010 AND 2011, S. REP. NO. 111-301, at 13 (2010).
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Amendment, was to highlight the differences between how the
governments of the United States and the Soviet Union interacted with the
media. Congress was able to trumpet the federal government’s relative
unwillingness to influence the media in large part because governmentproduced programming was primarily needed overseas to counter antiAmerican sentiment in countries of strategic importance. After the fall of
the Soviet Union and the rise of terrorism, however, government-produced
programming was needed to counteract anti-American sentiment abroad
and at home.103 It was this factor—national security—that spurred serious
discussions in Congress for repealing the domestic dissemination ban.104
Overall, the 2010 Bill indicates that Congress was willing to break
with decades of precedent by permitting government-produced
programming to be broadcast domestically in the name of combating
terrorism, but its conflicted language also indicates that Congress had not
lost sight of the potential danger of allowing the government to influence
public opinion through “domestic propaganda.”105 Finding the right balance
between disseminating government-produced programming within the
United States and preventing it from unduly influencing free American
discourse, however, proved difficult, which is why the 2010 Bill failed to
gain traction in Congress.
2. The 2012 Bill.—In 2012, Representatives Thornberry and Smith
again introduced legislation repealing the domestic dissemination ban
contained within the Smith–Mundt Act.106 This bill, entitled the “Smith–
Mundt Modernization Act of 2012” (2012 Bill), was similar to the 2010
Bill except that it omitted the 2010 Bill’s prohibition on “propagandizing”
and included clear carve-outs that permitted the government to broadcast
relatively freely within the United States. Unlike the 2010 Bill, the 2012
Bill was marketed not as national security legislation, but as government
transparency legislation.107 Belying its national security roots, however, the
2012 Bill was transposed into the voluminous “National Defense

103

See H.R. 5729.
Indeed, national security was the stated reason for the repeal in the 2010 Bill. Id. But see, e.g.,
Understanding the Smith–Mundt Modernization Act, HERITAGE FOUND., http://www.
heritage.org/events/2012/05/Smith–Mundt [http://perma.cc/H3KU-VQSK] (discussing how the repeal
of the domestic dissemination ban is grounded in considerations other than national security, such as
adapting to the realities of information technology and calls for greater government transparency).
105
See H.R. 5729; see also S. REP. NO. 111-301, at 13 (noting that a two-year dissemination
waiting period would assuage “domestic propaganda” concerns).
106
H.R. 5736, 112th Cong. (2012). It is noteworthy that, unlike previous amendments to the
Smith–Mundt Act, the congressional record surrounding both the 2010 Bill and the Smith–Mundt
Modernization Act of 2012 is sparse.
107
See Greenwald, supra note 8.
104
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Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013”108 (2013 Amendment), an omnibus
defense spending bill.109 It is unclear why the 2012 Bill was inserted into
this lengthy piece of legislation, but it may have been to avoid a
contentious debate like that which preceded the passage of the original
Smith–Mundt Act in 1948. Regardless of the actual reason, the tactic
proved successful: the 2013 Amendment passed both Houses in late
2012,110 and on January 2, 2013, President Barack Obama signed the
legislation into law.111 With that, the sixty-four-year-old domestic
dissemination ban was suddenly and unceremoniously abolished.
II. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE 2013 AMENDMENT
The 2013 Amendment is neither a dramatic breakthrough in
government transparency nor a harbinger of an Orwellian state. Rather, the
2013 Amendment merely grants the State Department and the BBG new
freedom to broadcast within the United States.
A. New and Preexisting Legal Restrictions
Although the 2013 Amendment repealed the blanket ban on the
domestic dissemination of government-produced programming, some
restrictions remain. Analyzing these restrictions is important to
understanding how government-produced materials may be disseminated
domestically; however, they do not, either separately or as a whole,
significantly impede the State Department and the BBG from distributing
their programming to the American public.
1. The “Upon Request” Restriction.—The “upon request”
restriction112 is a holdover from earlier versions of the Smith–Mundt Act.113
As its name implies, this restriction requires the State Department and the
BBG to disseminate materials within the United States only “upon

108

Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 1078, 126 Stat. 1632, 1957–59 (2013).
There were immaterial drafting changes between the 2012 Bill and the version that appeared in
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013. Compare id., with H.R. 5736.
110
H.R. 4310 (112th): National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr4310 [http://perma.cc/DFF7-PXYG].
111
Id.; see also Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the
President on H.R. 4310 (Jan. 2, 2013) (available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/01/03/statement-president-hr-4310). Although President Obama comments on several
sections of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, he does not mention the
section that contains the text of the 2012 Bill. Id.
112
22 U.S.C. § 1461 (2012).
113
See, e.g., id. (Supp. II 1948) (“[Materials], on request, shall be available in the English language
at the Department of State . . . .”).
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request.”114 In other words, the State Department and the BBG may not
disseminate their materials on their own volition, but may only make them
“available” to those who wish to access them. Prior to the 2013
Amendment, the only legal way to view contemporary governmentproduced materials was to examine them at the agencies themselves.115
Now, one may obtain broadcast-quality copies of this programming merely
by requesting them from the BBG.116 But the most direct and cost-effective
way to access State Department- and BBG-produced materials is simply to
view them online.117 The BBG posts nearly all of its content on the Internet
for free,118 such as news articles and broadcasts produced by Voice of
America (VOA),119 Radio Free Europe,120 Radio Free Asia,121 and other

114

Id. (2012). Additionally, the requesting third party may be required to reimburse BBG for
“reasonable costs.” Id.; Domestic Requests for Broadcasting Board of Governors Program Materials, 78
Fed. Reg. 39,584, 39,587 (July 2, 2013) [hereinafter BBG Regulations] (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pt.
502).
115
§ 1461(b)(1) (2006); see also Essential Info., Inc. v. U.S. Info. Agency, 134 F.3d 1165 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (rejecting a Freedom of Information Act request made by academics and journalists for
release of Internet addresses and programming materials generated by the USIA because the materials
were exempt from disclosure); Gartner v. U.S. Info. Agency, 726 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D. Iowa 1989)
(affirming the USIA’s decision to prohibit copying USIA materials verbatim and disseminating them
within the United States because doing so would have been in violation of the Smith–Mundt Act).
Notably, Americans could legally view materials more than twelve years old after the early 1990s. See
supra note 84 and accompanying text. In practice, however, this time limitation was immaterial;
Americans living within the United States could readily obtain BBG material in violation of the pre2013 Smith–Mundt Act. Daniel C. Walsh, The History of the U.S. Information and Educational
Exchange Act of 1948 and Three Arguments for the Termination of Its Prohibition on Domestic Release
of Information, INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y, Summer 2011, at 1, 10–12. The federal government did not
pursue legal action against these violators or the BBG, in part because the Smith–Mundt Act contained
“no criminal provisions . . . no penalties at all.” Id. at 11 (quoting former USIA attorney John
Lindberg).
116
§ 1461(b)(1) (2012). The BBG may charge fees at its discretion for access to its broadcastquality programming. Id.
117
See BBG Regulations, supra note 114, at 39,586. The BBG defines anyone who visits one of
their websites as a “Requestor.” Id. (“The Agency makes program materials available to Requestors
through the Agency’s news and information Web sites designed for foreign audiences.”). Arguably,
accessing a website is a volitional act; when a user clicks on a hyperlink to the BBG website or enters a
BBG web address in a web browser, the user is requesting to view that material. However, posting
material on a website may not always result in the user intentionally accessing the material. For
example, if another website provides an unattributed link to the BBG website, the user may be directed
to BBG content without the user’s knowledge. Whether the request must be intentional, however, is not
addressed in either the statute or the BBG regulations.
118
Id. (stating that there is no fee for accessing material on BBG websites).
119
VOICE OF AMERICA, http://www.voanews.com/ [http://perma.cc/K74G-HTQY].
120
RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, http://www.rferl.org/ [http://perma.cc/H6DB-872H].
121
RADIO FREE ASIA, http://www.rfa.org/english/ [http://perma.cc/9PMM-2NJT].
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government-funded news services, many of which are in foreign
languages.122
At first blush, the upon request restriction appears to prevent the State
Department and the BBG from imposing their programming on the
American public. For example, under this restriction, the State Department
and the BBG are prohibited from directly broadcasting their programming
over a government-owned-and-operated loudspeaker in a town square,
because in such a scenario, no one requested the material—it was
distributed to the American public without one or more citizens’ consent.
However, the State Department and the BBG are not barred from
disseminating their materials if they do not obtain the consent of every
citizen. Turning again to the loudspeaker example, a government-produced
program may be rebroadcast publicly if one private citizen first requested
the program and then rebroadcasts it herself. Even though the American
public may not have consented to listening to these broadcasts, because one
person consented to the broadcast, the upon request restriction is satisfied.
In essence, the upon request restriction permits the same distribution
method Senator Buckley attempted when he sought to rebroadcast the
government-produced film Czechoslovakia 1978, albeit on a much larger
scale: under the current Smith–Mundt Act, any citizen may attempt to
rebroadcast government-produced programming—not just members of
Congress.
The ease of rebroadcasting via third parties is troubling because the
potential for misleading the public is arguably greater than if the
government had broadcast this programming itself; because the message is
emanating from a private entity, the average citizen assumes that the
program was not produced by the government. Still, the upon request
restriction provides protection from the State Department and the BBG
directly imposing their message on the American public. But once
government-produced programming is in a third party’s hands, there are
virtually no restrictions on dissemination.123
a. The request procedure.—Requesting government-produced
programming is relatively straightforward.124 Any American may simply
visit one of the BBG’s many websites to access their content free of

122

E.g., ALHURRA, http://www.alhurra.com/ [http://perma.cc/W3CJ-EY8D] (Arabic); NOTICIAS
MARTÍ, http://www.martinoticias.com/ [http://perma.cc/F7Z3-WR26] (Spanish); RADIO SAWA,
http://www.radiosawa.com/ [http://perma.cc/5VRZ-HPQW] (Arabic).
123
The BBG may deny a request to use these materials if the third party acts contrary to the BBG’s
governing laws, regulations, and principles. BBG Regulations, supra note 114, at 39,587. However,
there is nothing in the BBG regulations that would revoke the third party’s right to rebroadcast these
materials. Id. at 39,584–87.
124
See supra note 117.
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charge.125 However, requesting broadcast-quality copies of State
Department- and BBG-produced programming—which may be used by
television and radio stations among others—requires a more formal
process.
There are two types of requests that a third party can make for
broadcast-quality materials: a “one-time” request126 and an “ongoing
subscription” request.127 In a one-time request, a citizen, media entity, or
organization makes a request to the BBG for programming, and the BBG
provides a broadcast-quality copy to the requestor.128 The request must
serve the BBG’s “statutory mission” and any other applicable laws and
regulations,129 and if it does not, the BBG may deny the request.130 The
BBG may also deny requests for several other reasons, including if the
requestor does not comply with third-party license requirements or neglects
to pay the BBG’s discretionary disbursement fee.131
An ongoing subscription request is similar to a one-time request,
except that it allows the BBG to make materials available on an “ongoing
basis” through a “subscription agreement.”132 In effect, this allows a
domestic entity to rebroadcast BBG programming within the United States,
almost as though the State Department or the BBG were broadcasting the
materials themselves. Through a subscription agreement, the third party
does not need to comply with the letter of the upon request requirement for
each piece of State Department- or BBG-produced programming. Once a
third party establishes a subscription agreement, that third party may
receive and rebroadcast government-produced programming without
having to file another request with the State Department or the BBG.
BBG regulations impose two notable restrictions on an ongoing
subscription agreement.133 First, the ongoing subscription broadcasts must
only rebroadcast BBG programming to “complement, rather than
duplicate” the programming produced by other private U.S. broadcasters.134
Thus, even under the amended Smith–Mundt Act, the State Department
125

See supra notes 117–18.
BBG Regulations, supra note 114, at 39,586.
127
Id. at 39,587.
128
Id. at 39,586.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 39,587.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
22 U.S.C. § 6202 (2012) (enumerating the BBG’s standards and principles); BROAD. BD. OF
GOVERNORS INT’L BROAD. BUREAU, II BAM 160 DOMESTIC DISTRIBUTION OF PROGRAM MATERIALS
1 (2013), available at http://www.bbg.gov/wp-content/media/2013/11/2-160-Domestic-Distribution-ofProgram-Materials.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y4RT-T5Z6].
134
BROAD. BD. OF GOVERNORS INT’L BROAD. BUREAU, supra note 133, at 2; see also §§ 1462,
6202(a)(3)–(4).
126
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and the BBG may not use third parties as a means to compete with private
broadcasters currently operating within the United States. Second, thirdparty broadcasters may not use government-produced programming to
“develop audiences within the United States.”135 What constitutes
“developing an audience” is, however, unclear—the criteria are simply
undefined. Although there is considerable uncertainty as to what
developing an audience entails, there already appears to be an exception to
this rule. BBG regulations explicitly encourage disseminating its materials
to those broadcasters located within U.S.-based “foreign diaspora
communities.”136 The BBG attempts to reconcile this tactic with the
aforementioned prohibition on developing an audience within the United
States by classifying people who belong to a foreign diaspora community
as members of a non-U.S. country. This classification scheme supposedly
allows the agency to target them as part of the BBG’s “foreign policy
mission.”137
2. Audience Restrictions.—The upon request restriction is not the
only restriction contained within the amended Smith–Mundt Act. Two
related restrictions introduced in the 2013 Amendment prohibit the State
Department and the BBG from either creating programming for a domestic
audience or broadcasting programming within the United States first before
disseminating it abroad.138 In other words, although the State Department
and the BBG may broadcast their programming within the United States,
the American people can be neither the intended nor the initial audience.
Although these two restrictions may appear to provide substantial
protection from the State Department and the BBG “propagandizing” the
American people, in practice they provide only minimal safeguards against
widespread dissemination of government-produced programming. The first
restriction—that government-produced programming may not be intended
for an American audience—is nearly impossible to verify. In certain
circumstances, programming intended for a foreign audience may be
indistinguishable from programming intended for a domestic audience. Say
the BBG produced a piece of programming endorsing U.S. intervention in a
foreign country that was first broadcast in an English-speaking country
such as the United Kingdom, Australia, or India. Barring an in-depth
135

BROAD. BD. OF GOVERNORS INT’L BROAD. BUREAU, supra note 133, at 1.
See id.
137
Id. This exception to the prohibition on developing a domestic audience requires further inquiry.
For example: Does the BBG believe that it can only disseminate its materials to domestic broadcasters
located in foreign diaspora communities? What are the criteria to determine which communities are
foreign diaspora communities? And would a third-party broadcaster be permitted to target only nonU.S. citizens, naturalized U.S. citizens, foreign-language-speaking U.S. citizens, or some combination
thereof?
138
§ 1461(b)(1).
136
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investigation into the story’s development from conception to broadcast,
there would be no way to determine whether the programming was
intended for a foreign audience or an American audience.139 The second
restriction—that government-produced programming must not be
disseminated within the United States before it is disseminated abroad—
has little significance.140 Because modern technology allows for the
instantaneous transmission of information across borders, this restriction
may result in only a negligible delay in the domestic dissemination of
government-produced programming—particularly for programming that
does not require translation.
3. The Influence Prohibition.—The most striking restriction in the
amended Smith–Mundt Act is paradoxically the least meaningful. The
amended Smith–Mundt Act retains the text of the 1985 Amendment drafted
by Senator Zorinsky, which states that “[n]o funds authorized to be
appropriated to the [State Department] or the [BBG] shall be used to
influence public opinion in the United States.”141 Standing alone, this
“influence prohibition” seems to prevent the State Department and the
BBG from disseminating government-produced programming within the
United States. After all, the fundamental purpose of this programming is to
influence public opinion.
But when the influence prohibition is read in conjunction with the
surrounding text, it provides little—if any—restriction on the conduct of
the State Department or the BBG. The amended Smith–Mundt Act
provides two enormous carve-outs to the influence prohibition. First, the
amended Smith–Mundt Act states that the influence prohibition does not
“prohibit or delay” the State Department or the BBG from “providing
information about its operations, policies, programs, or program
material.”142 Second, the Act states that the influence prohibition does not
“prohibit or delay” the State Department or the BBG from “making [their
programming] available, to the media, public, or Congress, in accordance
with other applicable law.”143 In other words, the revised Smith–Mundt Act
139

Even if the BBG were guilty of violating this provision, there are no clear consequences. See id.
§ 1461. And, even if they do violate the statutory restrictions in §§ 1461 and 1461-1a, recent history has
shown that there are virtually no consequences. See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 115, at 12.
140
It is generally believed that the older the programming is, the less impact it will have as
propaganda. Walsh, supra note 115, at 12.
141
§ 1461-1a(a); Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 1078, 126 Stat. 1632, 1958 (2013).
142
§ 1461-1a(a). A version of this exemption has existed since 1994. Id. § 1461-1a (1994).
However, the 2013 Amendment greatly expanded the scope of disclosure allowed by the State
Department and the BBG: instead of merely allowing these agencies to “respond[] to inquiries . . . about
its operations, policies, or programs” as before, id. amend. (2012), the State Department and the BBG
may now freely “provid[e] information about its operations, policies, programs, or program material” to
the U.S. public, id. (emphasis added).
143
Id. (1994).
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exempts all programming produced by the State Department and the BBG
from being subject to the influence prohibition, rendering this once
powerful restriction irrelevant.144
4. The “Covert Propaganda” Prohibition.—Perhaps the most
meaningful restriction on the widespread domestic dissemination of
government-produced programming lies outside of the Smith–Mundt Act.
The State Department’s appropriations bill prohibits the agency from
disseminating “propaganda” within the United States without the
authorization of Congress.145 According to the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO), programming is propaganda if it is: (1) selfaggrandizing, (2) purely partisan in nature, or (3) covert.146 Given that the
State Department and the BBG overwhelmingly produce apolitical news
stories, the first two categories—self-aggrandizement and partisan
materials—are largely inapplicable.147 However, the third category—
“covert propaganda”—is relevant to the State Department and the BBG.
Unlike the first two categories, covert propaganda does not restrict subject
matter; rather, it restricts the means of distribution. Even the most
innocuous State Department or BBG programming could be considered
covert propaganda if, without congressional approval, it is “circulated as
the ostensible position of parties outside the agency”148 through
“surreptitious means.”149
Essentially, an agency violates the covert propaganda prohibition if the
intended audience cannot ascertain the proper source of the governmentproduced materials.150 For example, in 1987, the State Department paid
unaffiliated consultants to write op-eds in support of the government’s
policy on Central America who in turn submitted the op-eds to newspapers
144

The BBG similarly believes that the influence prohibition does not restrict it from broadcasting
within the United States. In its agency regulations, the BBG maintains that although it is ostensibly
prohibited from influencing public opinion in the United States, it “may . . . [m]ake program materials
available in the Unites [sic] States, when appropriate.” BBG Regulations, supra note 114, at 39,586.
145
See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 7055, 125 Stat. 786,
1243–44 (2011).
146
KEVIN R. KOSAR, PUBLIC RELATIONS AND PROPAGANDA: RESTRICTION ON EXECUTIVE
AGENCY ACTIVITIES 6 (2005). Executive agencies defer to the GAO (formerly known as the U.S.
Government Accounting Office) for interpretation because “publicity” and “propaganda” are not
defined in the legislation. 1 OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 4-197 (3d ed. 2004).
147
See 1 OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 146, at 4-199 to -201.
148
See id. at 4-202.
149
KOSAR, supra note 146, at 7. However, government agencies may legally distribute unattributed
programming if (1) it is impossible to verify (e.g., promoting liberty generally), or (2) it influences only
the emotions of the public (e.g., placing an American flag behind a government spokesperson during a
speech). Id.
150
Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy, B-303495, 2005 WL 21443, at *4 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 4,
2005).
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under their own names.151 The GAO found that the State Department
violated the covert propaganda prohibition because the newspapers’ readers
incorrectly attributed the source of the op-eds to someone other than the
government agency.152 Similarly, in 2005, the GAO found a government
agency guilty of disseminating covert propaganda when it distributed
misleading, unattributed video news clips to television broadcasters.153
The covert propaganda prohibition provides the most promising check
on the State Department and the BBG from freely disseminating their
unattributed materials within the United States because, unlike the other
restrictions mentioned above, it has a track record of enforcement.
However, like these other restrictions, it, too, may have little effect in
practice. First, the covert propaganda prohibition may be inapplicable if the
2013 Amendment constitutes implicit congressional approval for
anonymous dissemination of government-produced programming. Broadly
construed, the 2013 Amendment, by virtue of abolishing the one
meaningful limitation on the domestic dissemination of governmentproduced programming, could be deemed congressional approval to engage
in otherwise prohibited covert propaganda.154 Even assuming that Congress
did not grant the State Department and the BBG permission to engage in
covert propaganda, proving a violation is exceedingly difficult—the agency
must have “attempt[ed] to persuade or deceive the public through
surreptitious means”155 beyond “any legitimate doubt.”156 In the unlikely
event of a violation, the repercussions are not severe;157 in the past, when

151

Dep’t of State’s Office of Pub. Diplomacy for Latin Am. & the Caribbean, 66 Comp. Gen. 707
(1987). Not all of the consultants’ op-eds were deemed covert State Department propaganda,
however—some were properly attributed. Id.
152
See id. at 708.
153
Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy, B-303495, 2005 WL 21443, at *5 (“By its own records,
ONDCP’s prepackaged news stories reached more than 22 million households, without disclosing to
any of those viewers—the real audience—that the products they were watching, which ‘reported’ on the
activities of a government agency, were actually prepared by that government agency, not by a
seemingly independent third party. This is the essence of the ‘covert propaganda’ violation—agencycreated materials that are ‘misleading as to their origin.’” (citation omitted)); see also Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., B-302710, 2004 WL 1114403, at *11 (Comp.
Gen. May 19, 2004).
154
In a 2005 GAO opinion, the ONDCP made a similar argument justifying its use of unattributed
government-produced programming because of a provision allowing “news media outreach” under the
Drug-Free Media Campaign Act of 1998. Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy, B-303495, 2005 WL
21443, at *6. Although the ONDCP’s argument failed, similar conduct under the amended Smith–
Mundt Act may be permissible because of the Act’s substantial carve-outs. See supra notes 141–44 and
accompanying text.
155
KOSAR, supra note 146, at 7.
156
1 OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 146, at 4-198.
157
See, e.g., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., B-302710,
2004 WL 1114403, at *11.
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agencies were found guilty of engaging in covert propaganda, they merely
submitted a report of wrongdoing to the President and Congress.158
Overall, because of the uncertainty over whether a violation could
even occur under the amended Smith–Mundt Act, the difficulty of proving
a violation, and the absence of meaningful consequences when a violation
does occur, this restriction cannot be relied upon to prevent the State
Department and the BBG from engaging in deceptive distribution of
government-produced programming. Other federal agencies have been
found guilty of violating similarly worded propaganda prohibitions in
recent years,159 and it would come as no surprise if the State Department
and the BBG were to engage in similar activity under the amended Smith–
Mundt Act.
B. Evaluating the Impact of the 2013 Amendment
The 2013 Amendment resolves key issues for supporters of national
security and government transparency. By repealing the Smith–Mundt
Act’s domestic dissemination ban, the 2013 Amendment permits the State
Department and the BBG to target those communities that are susceptible
to the anti-American propaganda that freely streams into the United
States.160 Additionally, the 2013 Amendment increases government
transparency by allowing the American public to monitor how the federal
government is spending taxpayer money on international broadcasting.161
Although this was an ancillary motive for the 2013 Amendment,162 there is
nonetheless great value in having researchers, journalists, and academics
independently analyze how the State Department and the BBG employ
government-produced programming. Moreover, the 2013 Amendment lets
the American people access reputable—albeit agenda-driven—news
sources, which may provide a more holistic picture of various issues.
Finally, the 2013 Amendment brings the Smith–Mundt Act in line with
technological realities. In the years leading up to 2013, the State
Department and the BBG did not police how their materials were
158

See, e.g., Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy, B-303495, 2005 WL 21443, at *8.
See KOSAR, supra note 146, at 1–3 (listing questionable and illegal propaganda activity by
executive agencies). This general lack of compliance is due in part to federal agencies not having the
appropriate measures in place to effectively monitor the dissemination of their materials. Id. at 5.
160
Rebecca A. Keller, Influence Operations and the Internet: A 21st Century Issue, MAXWELL
PAPER NO. 52, at 69, 75 (2010) (“[N]o . . . law prohibits foreign nations or organizations from targeting
US citizens with propaganda and/or deception.”). Perhaps the most notable foreign propaganda freely
accessible by Americans is Russia Today (RT), a quasi-news organization funded by the Russian
government. See Russia Today TV to Make Unique Contribution to Global Information—German
Expert, RIA NOVOSTI (July 6, 2005, 9:42 PM), http://en.ria.ru/society/20050607/40486831.html
[http://perma.cc/67CX-8RDZ].
161
See Metzgar, supra note 5, at 99.
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See supra Part I.D.
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disseminated within the United States, largely because of the difficulty
associated with restricting the flow of information in the Internet era.163
Now, should their materials reach those living in the United States, these
agencies need not worry about violating the Smith–Mundt Act.
However, the 2013 Amendment creates new problems. Allowing the
State Department and the BBG to freely disseminate their materials within
the United States could compromise free public discourse.164 Neither the
amended Smith–Mundt Act nor any other law or regulation contains
substantive limitations on what the State Department or the BBG may
disseminate within the United States.165 Although there are a number of
restrictions that the State Department and the BBG must follow, they are
ineffective, unverifiable, rendered irrelevant by carve-outs, or some
combination thereof. More critically, there are no meaningful consequences
should the State Department or BBG violate one or more of these
restrictions.
Theoretically, the American people have the ability to elect
representatives who would defund these agencies should they abuse their
power. However, this traditional check on government overreach is largely
ineffective against modern propaganda. Modern propaganda is often
indistinguishable from privately produced news because it is by-and-large
truthful and accurate; it gently guides a viewer to adopt a particular point of
view rather than inundate him with an obvious political message.166 Indeed,
there is little risk the State Department and the BBG will disseminate
patently inaccurate or misleading stories. The risk is that these agencies
will disseminate stories that cover only those issues that advance the
federal government’s stance, thereby painting an incomplete picture of the
issue. Thus, it is important that when the government speaks to the people,
it is clear who is speaking.
III. IMPLEMENTING ATTRIBUTION
The potential harm in the domestic dissemination of governmentproduced materials does not lie in government broadcasting itself; those
living in the United States are fully capable of recognizing the biases that
accompany government-produced programming.167 Rather, the potential
harm lies in disseminating these programs without attribution. The public
163

Compliance with the Smith–Mundt Act’s domestic dissemination ban leading up to the 2013
Amendment was questionable. See Walsh, supra note 115, at 9, 12–13.
164
See infra Part III.
165
See supra Part II.A. For proposed solutions to this issue, see infra Part III.
166
See Keller, supra note 160, at 79 (“Propaganda, to be effective, must be believed. To be
believed, it must credible. To be credible, it must be true.” (quoting Hubert H. Humphrey)).
167
See Palmer & Carter, supra note 5, at 6.
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expects independent analysis when watching private broadcasts.168 When
the public is misled about the independence of a broadcast, not only are the
viewers deceived, but also free public discourse as a whole is damaged.169
Hence, the State Department and BBG must be required to attribute their
programming.170
But unlike reinstituting a ban on the domestic dissemination of
government-produced programming, which is probably unenforceable
given modern information technology, implementing attribution has a
realistic chance of success and has already proven feasible in other
contexts.171 Attribution is also more desirable than banning the domestic
dissemination of government-produced programming because it prevents
the government from surreptitiously influencing public opinion without
denying the American public’s access to these materials.
As described below, attribution of government-produced programming
may be achieved in one of two ways: (1) by passing new attribution
legislation similar to that of the failed Truth in Broadcasting Act of 2005,
or (2) by expanding the judicially created government speech doctrine to
require these agencies to properly attribute any materials they distribute to
the American public.
A. Current Government-Produced Programming
It is common practice for news stations to broadcast news produced by
others. Private companies and federal government agencies frequently
produce and distribute video news releases (VNRs) that are then broadcast
without attribution on news stations across the country.172 According to a
2003 National Public Radio panel discussion on the use of VNRs, 100% of
television broadcasters aired VNRs, and many stations aired them several
times a month.173
Given the federal government’s willingness to work with broadcasters,
it is likely that the State Department and the BBG will begin distributing

168

Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83, 111 (2006).
Id. at 111–12 (“A stealth appeal in the evening news, where the audience may expect greater
independence . . . is more likely to deceive the audiences. Indeed, it is because such placements are
likely to deceive that stealth marketers find them valuable. Persuasion is easiest where the audience is
most credulous and least defended against promotional messages.”).
170
For examples of federal agencies, including the State Department, disseminating unattributed
programming, see supra notes 152–59 and accompanying text.
171
Attribution has been successfully implemented in campaign finance reform, for example. See
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–55, § 305, 116 Stat. 81, 101.
172
See Janel Alania, Note, The “News” from the Feed Looks Like News Indeed: On Video News
Releases, the FCC, and the Shortage of Truth in the Truth in Broadcasting Act of 2005, 24 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 229, 233 (2006).
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their own VNRs to interested broadcasters. As explained earlier in this
Note,174 State Department- and BBG-produced programming may be
provided to an interested broadcaster at no charge.175 The broadcaster
benefits from this arrangement because airing complimentary programming
allows the broadcaster to devote more resources to other projects.176
Typically, VNRs are, in fact, provided to broadcasters for free, because
under current law,177 neither the entity that produced the VNR nor the
broadcaster is legally compelled to attribute the source of the material,
allowing the relationship to persist undetected.178 A broadcaster has little
incentive to attribute these materials pro forma, because when the VNR is
aired anonymously, the audience assumes it was produced by the
broadcaster, thereby maintaining the appearance of credibility. However,
when VNRs are broadcast without attribution, the consumer does not view
them in the appropriate context, potentially resulting in a distorted opinion
of the issue. When this is repeated thousands of times over, society as a
whole risks unwittingly adopting a biased viewpoint.
B. Reviving the Truth in Broadcasting Act of 2005
In the early 2000s, the federal government widely distributed
unattributed government-produced programming within the United States.
From 2003–2005, the federal government spent $1.62 billion on VNRs and
other public relations programming,179 much of which was aired
anonymously.180 In response to this questionable practice, Senators Frank
Lautenberg (D-N.J.) and John Kerry (D-Mass.) introduced a bill entitled
the “Truth in Broadcasting Act of 2005,”181 which would have required the
federal government to “conspicuously identif[y]” any governmentproduced programming.182 This bill would have set forth clear, specific
attribution requirements. For television programs (e.g., VNRs), the bill
would have required the federal agency to display “PRODUCED BY THE
174

See supra Part II.A.1.a.
See Jeffrey Peabody, When the Flock Ignores the Shepherd—Corralling the Undisclosed Use of
Video News Releases, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 577, 579 (2008).
176
Id. at 581.
177
47 U.S.C. § 317(a)(1) (2012).
178
Id. Some have argued that this constitutes an in-kind contribution and thus should be attributed.
Peabody, supra note 175, at 593. Controversial or political messages are always subject to a disclosure
requirement. Goodman, supra note 168, at 97–98. However, given that most State Department and
BBG programming is apolitical news, it is unlikely that this material would be either controversial or
political. See, e.g., VOICE OF AMERICA, supra note 119.
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Bejesky, supra note 14, at 991.
180
The federal government produced and distributed hundreds of VNRs in support of invading Iraq
in the months leading up to the conflict. See id. at 990–92; Peabody, supra note 175, at 581–82.
181
S. 967, 109th Cong. (as introduced by Senate, Apr. 28, 2005).
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U.S. GOVERNMENT” onscreen for the program’s entire duration;183 for
radio programs, the bill would have required the federal agency to “audibly
inform” the audience that the program was produced by the federal
government.184 And, in order to prevent third-party tampering, the bill
would have made it illegal for “any person” to remove the government
attribution.185 This legislation, by virtue of its simplicity, specificity, and
comprehensiveness, would have made it nearly impossible for any federal
agency—including the State Department and the BBG—to air unattributed
programming within the United States.
Unfortunately, the Truth in Broadcasting Act was never passed. Before
it could go to a vote, the bill was completely rewritten. The revised Truth in
Broadcasting Act, renamed the “Prepackaged News Story Announcement
Act of 2005,” was a watered-down version of the original. In its edited
form, the bill vaguely required federal agencies to provide “clear
notification” that a program was prepared by the federal government.186
And, unlike the original Truth in Broadcasting Act, the Prepackaged News
Story Announcement Act did not make it unlawful to remove the
attribution from the broadcast, instead delegating the determination of
noncompliance to the Federal Communications Commission.187 So
ineffectual was the revised version of the legislation that one commentator
called it a “toothless hound” in comparison to the “watchdog” version that
preceded it.188 Even though this insipid version of the Truth in Broadcasting
Act may have been introduced to gain bipartisan support, it failed to do
so—the bill died in Congress.189
Exhuming the original text of the Truth in Broadcasting Act would
provide a much-needed check on the broad powers afforded to the State
Department and the BBG under the 2013 Amendment. For the legislation
to be effective, however, it must adopt the Truth in Broadcasting Act’s
requirement for explicit attribution of government-produced materials and
its strict anti-tampering penalties for third parties.190 But to be truly
effective, this legislation must go beyond the text of the Truth in
Broadcasting Act and establish meaningful, clearly defined penalties for a
183
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violation by a federal agency. Additionally, this legislation must require
independent oversight to verify that federal agencies are properly
attributing their programming. With these precautions in place, the risk of a
federal agency circumventing the law would be diminished significantly.
Passing attribution legislation in the same vein as the Truth in
Broadcasting Act of 2005 would preserve the benefits of the 2013
Amendment while minimizing its drawbacks. It would allow the State
Department and the BBG to legally broadcast its message within the United
States and promote the 2013 Amendment’s goal of greater government
transparency. But most importantly, effective attribution legislation would
assuage any concerns of the State Department and the BBG
“propagandizing” the American people.191 Admittedly, requiring attribution
may render government-produced programming less credible to its target
audience (i.e., those communities susceptible to anti-American
propaganda) because it would clearly flag when the government is voicing
its message. However, it is also possible that government programming
presented in an honest, transparent fashion would foster trust with its
viewership.
C. Revisiting Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n
The State Department and the BBG may also be compelled to attribute
any of their materials disseminated within the United States under the
government speech doctrine.192 This legal doctrine is in its nascent stages,
and its application to government-produced programming is uncertain.193
Nonetheless, it is an attractive route for requiring attribution because it
does not require the broad political support necessary to pass the effective,
but potentially controversial, attribution legislation described above.
In essence, the government speech doctrine protects the government
from First Amendment challenges.194 The government can selectively fund
a program to encourage activities that promote the public interest without
being required to also fund alternative programs that address the problem in
other ways.195 In so doing, the government is deemed not to have
discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; rather, “it has merely chosen to
fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.”196 In practical terms,
individuals cannot challenge government speech under the Free Speech
191

See Kidwell v. City of Union, 462 F.3d 620, 627 n.1 (6th Cir. 2006) (Martin, J., dissenting).
See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 578–80 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
193
Id. at 574 (“The government-speech doctrine is relatively new, and correspondingly
imprecise.”).
194
See Mia Guizzetti Hayes, Comment, First Amendment Values at Serious Risk: The Government
Speech Doctrine After Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 795, 802 (2006).
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Clause because it conflicts with their private viewpoints.197 This “glaring
exception to the First Amendment” allows the government to insert its
viewpoint in public discourse, without the need to also give a voice to those
groups with which it disagrees.198 Simply put, under this doctrine, the
government need not be “viewpoint neutral.”199
But not all speech emanating from the government is government
speech. Speech is only considered government speech when the
government communicates a message directly to the public, or
alternatively, when it uses private speakers to transmit specific information
pertaining to a government program.200 In this latter scenario, the private
actor is “essentially an organ of the government” so it is “constructively the
government that is speaking,” even though the message is disseminated by
a nongovernmental entity.201 However, the government is barred from
inserting government speech into certain public forums,202 such as in streets
and parks,203 public university funding of student publications,204 and
political elections.205 These are considered areas where the government is
deemed to be selecting a message, rather than voicing a message;206
whereas the former is considered unconstitutional because the government
is regulating private viewpoints, the latter is considered constitutional
because the government is simply advancing its viewpoint.207 It is a tenuous
distinction, and one that is often difficult to discern in practice.208
The government speech doctrine permits the State Department and the
BBG to disseminate their viewpoints within the United States without
violating the Constitution. When the State Department and the BBG speak
through a private entity (e.g., by transmitting VOA programming through a
private television or radio station), that speech is protected under the
government speech doctrine because it is transmitted directly through an
197
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Leading Case, Government Speech Doctrine—Compelled Support for Agricultural Advertising,
119 HARV. L. REV. 277, 283–84 (2005).
199
Id. at 283.
200
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).
201
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117 HARV. L. REV. 2411, 2416 (2004).
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organ of the government209 and because it does not take place in one of the
public forums that require viewpoint neutrality.210 Therefore, the State
Department and the BBG need not be concerned about presenting
viewpoint-neutral programming, and may selectively choose to cover some
stories over others.211
However, it is less clear whether the State Department and the BBG
need to attribute their message under the government speech doctrine.
Between 2000 and 2001, the Supreme Court held in Board of Regents of
University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth and in Legal Services Corp.
v. Velazquez that the government generally must be accountable to the
electorate when it speaks.212 However, just a few years after these rulings,
the Court refined its stance in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n.213 In
this case, two beef producing associations brought action against the United
States Department of Agriculture and sought injunctive relief with respect
to the generic advertising funded by targeted assessment on cattle sales and
importation.214 The advertisements promulgated by the government were
attributed to “America’s Beef Producers” without any explicit mention of
the government’s support or involvement.215 The claimants argued that the
government was improperly concealing its role in funding the campaign.216
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that given the particular facts
of the case, the government was not obligated to clearly attribute its
involvement because the constitutionality of the advertisements did not rest
upon “whether or not the reasonable viewer would identify the speech as
the government’s.”217 Although the Court stopped short of permitting the
government to broadcast its message without attribution in all situations, it
indicated that, at least in certain circumstances, the government need not
identify itself when communicating with the public.
In his dissent, Justice Souter vehemently disagreed with the majority’s
stance that the American people need not always know when the
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government is speaking.218 To protect the public’s First Amendment rights,
Justice Souter argued that “the political process [must serve] as a check on
what government chooses to say.”219 When the public does not know if the
government is speaking, they are ignorant of the government’s position,
meaning that the government can engage in any speech—however
controversial—without fear of electoral repercussions.220 Therefore, Justice
Souter argued, the public must always know when the government is
speaking221—an opinion not unlike that held by those who supported the
passage of the Truth in Broadcasting Act of 2005.222
Johanns served only to further muddy the waters for an already
unclear issue about whether government-produced materials should be
properly attributed. Interestingly, the reasoning espoused in Justice
Souter’s dissent has gained traction in a number of federal circuits. In the
2006 Sixth Circuit case American Civil Liberties Union of Tennessee v.
Bredesen, the court interpreted the majority’s opinion in Johanns narrowly,
advancing the position that if speech is controlled by the government, the
government must attribute its involvement.223 Later, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed Bredesen in Kidwell v. City of Union.224 In the Kidwell dissent,
Judge Boyce Martin, Jr. went even further than the majority in affirming
Bredesen, arguing that government speech should be attributed in order “to
prevent confusion and subliminal governmental propaganda in the
marketplace of ideas.”225 The Ninth Circuit has also suggested that
attribution may be required under the government speech doctrine, stating
that “an attribution claim might form the basis for an as-applied First
Amendment challenge” to government speech.226 The majority of circuits
have yet to address this issue post-Johanns, which leaves open the
possibility that other circuit courts will join the Sixth and Ninth Circuits in
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support of Justice Souter’s belief that government speech should be
attributed.
The trajectory of the government speech doctrine indicates that a
judicially imposed attribution requirement for government-produced
programming may be on the horizon. The Southworth and Velazquez
opinions, Justice Souter’s dissent in Johanns, and the recent opinions of the
Sixth and Ninth Circuits constitute a growing body of law supporting
attribution when the government speaks. This is an encouraging
development. If the American people cannot reasonably identify when the
government is speaking to them, it makes sense that the government should
be compelled to attribute the source. Otherwise, the American people will
have no knowledge of the government’s actions and thus no compulsion to
push back, potentially affording the government “enormous power” over
public discourse.227 Whether a judicially imposed attribution requirement
will take hold, however, is far from certain given the volatility of the
government speech doctrine in recent years.228
CONCLUSION
The domestic dissemination ban in the Smith–Mundt Act is rooted in
the Cold War. As with other vestiges of that era that have succumbed to
technological and social modernity, so, too, has the domestic dissemination
ban. The 2013 Amendment now allows the State Department and the BBG
to better combat domestic terrorism, and also promotes greater government
transparency. However, the 2013 Amendment creates new problems. Now,
there is little preventing the State Department and the BBG from widely
disseminating unattributed government-produced programming within the
United States.
The danger of domestic dissemination does not lie in the dissemination
itself; rather, it lies in anonymous dissemination. To curb the potential harm
of covert government propaganda, there must be either legislation or a
judicial doctrine that requires the State Department and the BBG to
attribute their materials. The Truth in Broadcasting Act of 2005 provides an
excellent template for a future bill that would require attribution on
government-produced programming. Similarly, a judicially imposed
attribution requirement under the government speech doctrine may also
solve the problem. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits’ acceptance of Justice
Souter’s reasoning in the Johanns dissent indicate that a judicially imposed
attribution of government-produced programming may be forthcoming.
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Fortunately, there is little evidence that the State Department and the
BBG have any desire to “propagandize” the American people.229 But the
best rules are ones that are enacted before they are needed. It is critical to
establish safeguards now—before the United States enters into a new
conflict or engages in some other highly controversial activity—that will
prevent the federal government from covertly influencing public opinion
within the United States. The government will continue to speak, and the
American people must know to whom they are listening.
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